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In the Sttpreme Court of the
State of Utah

ANGUS H. BISHOP,
Respondent and Cross Appellant,

vs.
DOCK CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY,
Appellant and Cross Respondent,
DUCK CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY,
BENJAMIN DRAINAGE DISTRICT,
KENNETH DIXON, CARL LINDSTROM,
LEO STEELE, LAVON PAYNE, RULON
CREER and JOHN B. JONES,
Defendants.

NO.
7660

Brief of Duck Creek Irrigation Company, a Corporation, in Answer to Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing
STATEMENT OF CASE
The plaintiff has asked for a rehearing, specifying two
grounds:
1. It is claimed that the Supreme Court mandate "to
award to the irrigation company the ordinary flow of Duck
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Creek which is controlled, diverted and used by means of
dams as presently constructed", is indefinite and unenforceable.
2. It is further asserted by plaintiff that this Court
erred in approving findings that one second foot of water
should be a warded to each 50 acres of land and that therefore the Duck Creek Irrigation Company should be awarded
a prior right of not less than six second feet.
It appears that these grounds are somewhat inconsis-

tent, for complaint is made of an alleged indefinite award
in one and a definite a ward in another.
The position of the defendant, Duck Creek Irrigation
Company, and we think the effect of this Court's decision,
is as follows:
1. The mandate is not indefinite or unenforceable, but
the decision adequately establishes the law of the case to
enable and require the lower court to enter findings, conclusions and judgment and the mandate is in accord with the
practice in numerous cases. The plaintiff has misconceived
the effect of the mandate and the opinion, but if there is
any uncertainty it can be readily corrected by this Court
by inserting in the mandate the specific amount of the primary right between six second feet indicated by the opinion as the minimum and the amount of eight second feet
claimed in the brief of Duck Creek Irrigation Company.
2. This Court did not err in approving findings that
one second foot of water should be awarded to each fifty
acres of land and that, therefore, the Duck Creek Irrigation Company should be awarded a prior right of not less
than six second feet, since the trial court's findings as to
duty of water were questioned neither by plaintiff nor de-
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fendant on this appeal and since the record abundantly establishes such duty.
The decision of this Court as applied to the record is
regular and proper and will enable and require the lower
court to enter findings and decree consistent with the decision and without any uncertainty therein; the record would
authorize the Supreme Court in specifically directing what
the award of the. primary right must be, but it is entirely
proper for it to direct that the ordinary flow, not less than
six second feet, be a warded to Duck Creek as a primary
right, leaving the District Court to award a greater amount
up to the eight second feet claimed by the company should
it determine that this is in accordance with the record. We
think that the Supreme Court should have specifically required the award of eight second feet as a primary right
instead of not less than six second feet; but plaintiff is in
no position to complain of this.
ARGUMENT
In general

There seems no merit whatsoever in plaintiff's petition
for rehearing, unless it is that this Court should m()dify its
decision to direct specifically that the lower court award
eight second feet to Duck Creek Irrigation Company as a
prior right, with the percentage of the high water right as
now provided. If this is not done, the decision should stand
to the effect that it should award not less than six second
feet ·as a prior right, with such additional amount, if any,
·which the trial court may may find consistently with the
decision comprises the_ ordinary flow appropriated as a primary right by Duck Creek, together with the present percentage of the high water.
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The plaintiff first says that the mandate is uncertain
and then objects because it specifically requires the award
of a duty of fifty acres per second foot. We think that
the form of the court's mandate is usual and proper, but if
any change should be made, this would require or justify
no rehearing; the Court should simply direct the award of
eight second feet, or such other amount in excess of six second feet as the evidence in its judgment requires. If it is
left to the trial court as under the present mandate to fix
the amount in excess of six second feet, we are confident
that the record abundantly establishes that this primary
right should be eight; in the event that this Court wishes
to fix the specific amount of the primary right in excess
of six, we have cited below some of the evidence upon the
basis of which this should be done; and other evidence is referred to in the opinion of this Court.

I.
The mandate is not indefinite or unenforceable, but the decision adequately establishes the law of the case, and definitely guides the lower court to the entry of revised findings and decree in accordance therewith.
The vice of plaintiff's argwnent on this point is that it
seizes upon a sentence or two in the opinion and disregards
the decision in its entirety. The entire opinion must be
considered in determining its effect, but the following excerpts will be adequate to show that plaintiff's petition is
not well taken:
"The controversy herein is over rights to the water of Duck Creek, just south of Benjamin, Utah County. The trial court decreed to the Duck Creek Irri-
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gation Company, appellant herein, a basic flow of two
second feet and ordered the rest of the stream divided
tween the parties: 300/368 to appellant and 68j368 to
respondent during the irrigation season; and 400/568
to appellant and 168j568 to respondent during the nonirrigation season. . . . Appellant attacks this decree as not being supported by the evidence. It contends that it and its stockholders now do, and from
time immemorial (at least back to 1870) have owned,
controlled and used all of the 'ordinary flow' of the
stream and that the only right or use plaintiff or his
predecessors have ever had in it is to excess overflow
water which was not caught and controlled by appellant's dams and used by them and which therefore
naturally found its way on the plaintiff's lower land
to the west . . . .
''It is established by the evidence without dispute
that the irrigation company and its predecessros, both
long before and ever since 1903, by means of the two
upper dams, did impound, control and use all of the
ordiriary flow of the stream, and also diverted and
used a portion of the high water to pasture land; and
that the only use of waters of Duck Creek by the plaintiff and his predecessors was that in times of high water the excess which was not so caught and used by
the irrigation company naturally escaped down the
stream and onto the plaintiff's lower land to the west
and was there used . . . . It is therefore an inquiry of prime importance as to whether the two c.f.s.
allowed the appellant amounted to the 'ordinary flow'
of the stream as always used by the appellant. The
evidence seems conclusive that it was not.
I

''J. W. Stewart, another witness for the appellant,
said that the irrigation company's two dams (Upper
Dam and Duck Creek Dam) would take care of about
six to seven second feet and that after they began to
irrigate they would continue to take practically the
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whole stream, and that after the spring high water
the stream would continue to decline down to two or
three c.f.s. and by July be practically dwindled out.
There was other testimony that these two dams would
handle as much as ten second feet which would be used
by the irrigation company as long as it was available.
All of the witnesses, both for the plaintiff and defendants, who testified on that subject said that a stream
of 2 c.f.s. was practically valueless for irrigation in appellant's irrigation system, the reason being that the
land was so near level that such stream would not be
enough water to be useful and in fact would scarcely
even reach the land further to the north.
"Further indication that the two second feet
awarded to appellant is inadequate is as follows: The
Court found the duty of water there to be 1 c.f.s. for
fifty acres; he also found that the stockholders of appellant company had irrigated 300 acres of land with
this water. Upon that basis, it would appear that they
ought to have a primary right to at least six second
feet of water, together with the right to use such proportion of the 'high water' as they customarily used
for irrigation of pasture land before letting the excess
run on down to Bishop's land.
". . . . Appellant has the right to all of the
water in Duck Creek up to the 'ordinary flow' as controlled by their dams as presently constituted and to
participate in the use of waters in excess thereof on
the basis found by the trial court. The only right
shown in plaintiff is to participate in the use of waters
not so used by defendants.
". . . . The trial court viewed the premises
and found that there was such irrigation ditches; and
on conflicting evidence determined a prescriptive right
existed in the plaintiff to use the ditches and laterals
from Duck Creek Dam, and this finding must be sus-
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tained. However, the right to use them is limited to
be consistent with the evidence concerning the use establishing such prescriptive rights, that it, to the diversion and conveyance of excess overflow water
through the ditches in such manner as not to interfere
with the use thereof by the owners.
''It appears necessary to remand this case to the
District Court to modify the decree:

"1.

To award to the irrigation company the or-

dinary flow of Duck Creek which is controlled, di-

verted and used by means of dams as presently constituted.
"2. To limit the use by plaintiff of the ditches
and laterals of the irrigation company and its .stockholders as hereinabove indicated.
"3.

To omit any award to Carl Lindstrom.

''In other respects the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed. Costs to appellant."
It will be noted that this decision disposes of every issue on the appeal and directs what is to be done. It sets up
a guide to the trial court to enter a revised decree, awarding the ordinary flow to Duck Creek which it determines
is not less than six second feet. It limits the use of
ditches, consistent with the awards mentioned. It sustains
the percentage awards of the high water between the parties. It strikes the award to Carl Lindstrom, and in other
respects directs that the judgment shall stand. Any trial
court desiring to follow this mandate would have no trouble
whatever in entering the revised decree in conformance
thereto as directed. If it should fail to do so, which is unthinkable, the matter could be corrected on a further appeal. This court could have fixed the flow specifically at
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six, seven or eight second feet, but apparently preferred to
lay down the law, and the minimum the evidence would
warrant, and leave to the trial court the fixing of a greater
amount if it so determined on the evidence. The taking of
no further evidence was directed, nor is it necessary, as
plaintiff concedes in his brief. This Court could upon this
petition set the defendant's primary right at six second feet
which it has held to be the minimum that is authorized by
the evidence, or at eight second feet as we believe the evidence requires, but the fact that it has left, consistent with
its opinion, the fixing of the upper limit to the trial court
does not authorize plaintiff to charge that the decision violates the principles of the cases which he cites. No one is
contending that the judgment will be left to award simply
"the ordinary flow." Certainly it is to be expected that if
this Court does not specify the amount above six second
feet, the trial court in response to the mandate of this opinion will do so.
Plaintiff's authorities are wholly immaterial.
Rules of Civil Procedure, 76, provides:

Utah

(a) DECISION OF SUPREME COURT: Opinion to be in writing. The Supreme Court may reverse,
affirm or modify any order or judgment appealed from
and may, in case the findings in any case are incomplete in any respect, order the court from which the
appeal was taken to add to, modify or complete the
findings so as to make the same conform to the issues
presented and the facts as the same may be found to
be by the trial court from the evidence, and may direct
the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with
the findings when corrected as aforesaid, or may direct a new trial in any case, or further proceeding to
be had . . . "
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The foregoing provision is substantially the same as
was contained in Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-4123.
It was held under the latter section that the Supreme
Court may modify the decree of the court below, as well
as the findings of fact, whether any basis for such modification be found in the findings or not. Salina Creek Irrigation Co. v. Stock Co., 7 Utah 456-60, 27 Pac. 578; aff'd
163 U. S. 109, 41 L. ed 90, 16 S. Ct. 1036. While the Supreme Court itself in an equity case may enter a judgment
instead of remanding the case, Melen v. Vonder-Horst Bros.,
44 Utah 300, 140 Pac. 130, it may also remand the case for
the trial cow~t to enter judgment in accordance with the
Supreme Court mandate. Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 109,
39 P.2d 755, superseded by 88 Utah 131, 48 P.2d 473; 88
Utah 146, 54 P.2d 1213, and where it is more convenient
to make and enter conclusions of law and judgment in the
district court the Supreme Court will do no more than indicate and direct what the findings, conclusions and judgments shall be, and remand. Wheelwright v. Roman, 50
Utah 10, 165 Pac. 513. In Big Cottonwood Lower Canal ·
Co. v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274 Pac. 454, the Supreme Court
simply modified the judgment of the lower court by increasing the quantity of water allowed to appellant by the
trial court.
Moreover, in Mountain Lake Min. Co. v. Midway Irr.
Co., 47 Utah 371, 154 Pac. 584, after reversal and remand
to the trial court with directions to enter judgment, but
before the remittitur had gone do~, the Supreme Court
determined that it had ample power to amend its judgment~
so as to make it conform to the opinion of the majority of
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the court. Thus, at this stage in the proceeding, with a petition for rehearing pending, the Court could, if it desired,
specify the exact quantity of water the Duck Creek Irrigation Company was entitled to, instead of remanding the
case for the trial court to proceed in accordance with the
opinion, to award the primary right of six second feet of
water, or more, depending upon what was· determined to
be the ordinary flow if this exceeded six second feet.
In Wheelwright v. Roman, supra, the form of theremand was, ''The findings of fact and conclusions of law, so
far as inconsistent with this opinion, are set aside, and the
judgment reversed. The cause is remanded to the district
court, with directions to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the views expressed in
this opinion, and to enter judgment," (etc.). In Salina
Creek Irr. Co. v. Salina Stock Co., et al, supra, the mandate
was: "This case is remanded, with directions to the court
below to modify the decree and findings so as to conform
to this opinion."
In Wherritt v. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 159 Pac. 534, the
court said, "In view that this is an equity case we can direct what orders should be made in order to fully dispose
of the case. The judgment is therefore reversed, and, insofar as the findings of fact and conclusions of law are in
conflict with our views herein, they are vacated and set
aside, and the district court of Wasatch County is directed
to make findings and conclusions of law to conform to the
views herein expressed and to enter a decree ordering
" (etc.) In Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co.
v. Cook, et al, supra the mandate of the court was worded
as follows: ''It is ordered that the findings and decree be
modified by increasing the quantity of water to which de-
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fendant, Heber Cook, is entitled to use for irrigation purposes from 4 acre feet per annum for the irrigation of 1
acre of land to 6 acre feet of water per annum for the irrigation of 1 :Y2 acres of land. In all other respects the decree and judgment are approved and affirmed. The cause
is remanded to the district court, with directions to modify
the findings and decree to conform herewith. Appellants
to recover costs."
In Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 146, 54 P.2d 1213, upon
the petition for rehearing filed by one of the defendants, the
Supreme Court made modifications by way of additions to
its opinion, and in view of such modifications denied the
petition for rehearing.
The appellate court may order the necessary modifications to be made by the lower court instead of making
the correction itself, it being often held discretionary with
the appellate court either to make the modification on its
own records or to remand the case to the lower court with
specific directions to that court to make such modifications.
5 CJS, "Appeal and Error", Sec. 1874 (a), (b), p. 1360.
In the absence of statute to the contrary no particular form
of mandate is required as long as proper effect is given to
the decision of the court. ·Ibid, Sec. 1961, p. 1491. On remand the lower court has jurisdiction to take such action
as law and justice may require under the circumstances as
long as it is not inconsistent with the mandate and judgment of the appellate court. Ibid, Sec. 1965, p. 1510.

It thus appears that under the present mandate and
opinion the district court could readily proceed in compliance therewith to enter modifications to the decree awarding Duck Creek Irrigation Company six second feet of water as a primary right, or such additional amount as it
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might find from the evidence before it to comprise the ordinary flow used by said defendant in years past as a prior
right, by modifying the provisions as to ditch rights accordingly and by eliminating the award to Lindstrom, and by
leaving the award of excess water as in the lower court's
decree provided.
The trial court should experience no difficulty whatsoever, in entering judgment in accordance with the views
expressed in this opinion. However, since there is only
one uncertainty complained of in the motion for rehearing,
and in view of the above authorities, the Supreme Court
may, if it chooses, specify whether the primary right should
be six second feet or such other amount as it determines,
and upon such modification the petition for rehearing should
likewise be denied.
The opinion of the Supreme Court refers to various
phases of the evidence and states upon that basis it would
. appear that the stockholders of the company ought to have
a primary right to at least six second feet of water, together
with the right to use such proportion of the "high water"
as they customarily used for irrigation of pasture land before letting the excess run on down to Bishop's land, and
it is specifically concluded that ''appellant has the right to
all of the water in Duck Creek up to the 'ordinary flow' as
controlled by their dams as presently constituted and to
participate in the use of waters in excess thereof on the
basis found by the trial court. The only right shown in
plaintiff is to participate in the use of waters not so used
by defendants."
We shall not attempt to repeat the outline of facts
contained in our principal brief on the amow1t to which the
company is entitled. The opinion of this Court refers to cer-
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tain evidence which it is believed shows conclusively that
the primary right before pro-ration should be more than
six second feet. We direct the Court's attention also to
the following pages of transcript which indicate clearly, we
believe, that the primary right should be eight second feet.
Plaintiff's counsel during the trial conceded that plaintiff claimed no rights to, or from, the Upper Dam or in the
ditches leading therefrom (T. 20-21). Stevens testified
that Duck Creek Dam from June first on is practically a
tight dam, that whenever the water gets low, Duck Creek
is a tight dam (T. 77). For the water that he used down
at the Stevens Dam he depended largely after June first on
the seepage water that runs into Duck Creek below the
Duck Creek Dam (T. 84). Stevens' judgment was that the
available flow at the Duck Creek Dam along the first part
of May would be from ten to twenty second feet and that
it would go down to five second feet about the fifth of June
(T. 102). Stevens' son, Howard, testified that when the
company's stockholders started to water the grain, from
then on, Stevens didn't interfere with them if they found
they were using it. They started to irrigate grain about
the middle of May to the first of June (T. 239). He further testified that he never did go up and talk to the men
on the Upper Dam about turns; he had no interest in it
(T. 249), and that whenever he took the water out of Duck
Creek, the stream was big-generally ten second feet or
better (T. 250). (It is to be remembered that his observations were at the Duck Creek Dam, after the Upper Dam
stream had been taken out.) Bishop, the plaintiff, testified that there was ten second feet of water in the lower
dam when he turned it on his meadow, but he didn't know
what was at the Upper Dam.
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J. W. Stewart testified that in the early days there
would be three-fourths of a mile north and south and a
mile east and west irrigated by the predecessors of the
Duck Creek Irrigation Company, and that in the early part
of the irrigation season they w<;>uld take out from six to
seven second feet in both dams (T. 365) and that they would
take all the water there whenever they took it out (T. 366).
During the low water season of the year, they took all the
water out of both the Upper Dam and the Lower Dam when
they would get to irrigating; he never saw the time when
they wouldn't take it all (T. 375). The size of the ditch
that they used to divert water from the Upper Dam was
about five feet across the top and about three or four feet
deep. That was in in about 1880. He saw flowing ~ that
ditch about four or five second feet (T. 464). If there
would be no high water there would be no hay (T. 466).
Mrs. Charles W. Hickman testified that the earliest time
for irrigation she used about four second feet of water at
the Upper Dam (T. 394). Clay Ashworth said the water
was put on the pasture along in April (T. 514). They used
to irrigate the hay more in May and June. It depended on
the season. Other than hay and grass-land, they ordinarily began to irrigate down there the latter part of May,
that is, for grain. That is about right for alfalfa, too (T.
515). George W. Tucker said they started to irrigate on
the average in May (T. 528). Francis L. Uu.ndell says the
stream starts to dwindle in April as a general rule (T. 572573). At the point where his father diverted water, he
would take all the water as early as the middle of May, so
that there would be none flowing by the dam (T. 576). As
a general rule the water would decrease to the point where
it was all used for irrigation at the two dams as early as
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the first of May to the fifteenth of May, taking that as an
average. The only time there would be any overflow at
either dam would be if they would get a heavy rainfall and
a quick flush that might last for three or four days (T. 589).
LaVon E. Payne said that after the first of May practically
all the water has been taken out except the excess when
it has rained quite a bit and it has come down in floods (T.
712). Ifu hadn't been able to water anywhere near all his
place after the irrigation season started. The irrigation
season starts possibly the earliest before the first of May;
on the pasture land earlier than that (T. 716). The latest
time to begin watering and irrigating crops would be the
first of June. High to them meant more than they could
handle in their ditches. Other than the grass land, they
have been irrigating about the first of May (T. 717). Engineer Jacobs testified that a good stream economically
used would be three or four second feet, and a good irrigator would handle five or six (T. 434). Under this testimony, at the very least the quantity at each dam would be
three or four second feet as a priority, or a total of six to
eight second feet and as a maximum, twelve, since it would
be expected that with water available those having control
would use at least such minimum amount at each dam.
The capacity of the company's ditc}?.es from each dam is
ten second feet or a total capacity of twenty second feet
(T. 835-838).
This Court, we believe, should find and determine that
the amount of the Duck Crek Irrigation Company's prior
right is between six and eight second feet of water, with
the right to pro-rate in the high water as determined by
the district court, or should direct the lower court to enter
findings accordingly. We believe that this is just what this
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Court has done in its present opinion, leaving to the lower
court the fixing of the exact amount of primary right between six and eight second feet.
B.
This Court did not err in approving findings that one second foot of water should be awarded to each fifty acres of
land, and therefore the Duck C~k Irrigation Company
should be awarded a prior right of not less than six second
feet, since the trial court's findings as to duty of water
were questioned neither by plaintiff nor defendant on this
appeal, and since the record abundantly establishes such
duty.

The plaintiff now contends that the Court erred in
approving findings that one second foot of water should be
a warded to each fifty acres of land, "and that therefore the
Duck Creek Irrigation Company should be awarded a prior
right of not less than six second feet."
This argument is significant, because it shows that the
mandate of the Supreme Court is not uncertain in the mind
of plaintiff's counsel ·in that it holds that the primary right
of Duck Creek is at least six second feet. The Supreme
Court, except as expressly held, has approved the findings
of the trial court.' One of those findings is that the duty
of water is fifty acres per second foot; the other is that the
irrigation company had 300 acres of cultivated land and
134 acres of pasture land, or a total of 434 acres.
Plaintiff did not question the finding on duty of water
or assign any error with respect thereto. While plaintiff
referred to Engineer Jacobs' testimony as to a possible duty
of water at seventy acres, he did not assign error or attack
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the court's findings on duty of water, and in fact, sought to
rely thereon in trying to justify his award. Respondent's
cross appeal was directed entirely to different points (See
p. 40 of his original brief). It is too late now, on a motion
for rehearing to seek a cross appeal on a new ground or
assign additional error. A finding not assigned as error is
not presented for review. Mountain Lake Mining Co. v.
Midvale Irr. Co.~ supra.
Our original brief is referred to for detailed citations
to the record. The findings of the trial court on duty of
water and this Court's decision recognizes the record cited.
We might add without undue repetition that under the original incorporation the water was divided evenly between
the Upper and the Lower Dams. There were almost three
times as many acres under the Lower Dam as under the
Upper Dam. The original plan was to have one share of
water per acre of land, but the Upper Dam, having between
100 and 150 acres of cultivated land under it, got about 234
shares and the Lower Dam having about three times as
much land-approximately 350 acres or more-got an equal
number of shares. Neither got as much water as they
could beneficially use, but they divided all the water between them (T. 326-328, 629, 657).
Much is made by plaintiff of Engineer Jacobs' testimony that the duty of water would be seventy acres per
second foot. Counsel disregards the basic meaning of duty,
which involves the assumption of a steady flow. The evidence indicates .that the stream in question varies from an
abundance to almost nothing and the variation is not only
betwen seasons but over relatively short periods during the
irrigation season when there is rain. Jacobs, himself, testified that he assumed that the water would be available
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as needed in estimating his duty, and that he thought that
at the rate he testified to, the land would need a steady
stream. The Court did not have to disregard Jacobs' testimony to arrive at the duty of fifty acres per second foot,
because Jacobs assumed a steady stream. Moreover, the
court himself inspected the land, and also had the benefit
of practical irrigators showing that there. was not enough
water to get over the ground. The case of Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 Pac. 273, is cited by plaintiff to show
that a decree must be certain. With this we agree, and we
say that based on the Supreme Court's mandate, the decree can and will be made certain by the trial court by following the directions of the Supreme Court, or this Court
can on this motion, fix the definite amount without leaving
it to the trial court. But the significant thing about the
Whitmore case is that in that case the trial court did follow
literally the ideas of the expert witness Tanner on the duty
of water, and failed to properly analyze such testimony and
to give effect to the testimony of practical irrigators. This
is the error which plaintiff's counsel would have this Court
invite, but in the Whitmore case, the trial court's award of
four second fet, based upon a construction of the expert's
testimony as to duty of water was raised by .the Supreme
Court to five second feet, the lower court being thus reversed. Here we have a .finding of duty by the trial court
which is based upon a fair analysis of the expert's testimony, as well as upon the testimony of practical irrigators
and the judge's own personal inspection of the land in question. Certainly the contention of the plaintiff, made at
this stage, or at any other, which would overthrow that
finding, is not meritorious.
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CONCLUSION

We do not question that the award of a water right
in general terms is not proper, and we do not question the
cases cited by plaintiff, but he has set up a straw man.. The
decision of the Supreme Court definitely establishes the law
of the case and directs entry of judgment in a manner that
no court could misunderstand, simply leaving to the trial
court the fixing of the ordinary flow at not less than six
second feet, and in such additional amount as it believes
the record to justify, consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion. The objections to the finding on duty of water
now made by plaintiff are not meritorious because plaintiff
at no previous time attacked such finding, but relied upon
them in seeking to sustain his award, and for the further
reason that the evidence abundantly establishes it. Since
the duty of water as determined by the trial court and the
acreage as fixed by the trial court are unimpeached by
plaintiff (not less than 300 acres of crop land with an additional134 acres of pasture land) the· amount of the award
of the primary right during the irrigation season beginning
May first is definite, as far as plaintiff is concerned. That
the irrigation company claims that this acreage is greater
cannot avail the plaintiff.
However, to save argument before the trial court,
should plaintiff be disposed to further argue claimed uncertainties, the Supreme Court, as it has done in other cases
cited above, could, if it chooses, modify its closing mandate
to have the same express what its effect really is in view
of the whole opinion. With or without such modification,
the motion for rehearing should be denied. There would
be no purpose whatsoever in a rehearing since nothing new

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
has been raised which has not been fully argued and decided. The closing paragraph might be in the following
fonn:
It appears necessary to remand this case to the
District Court to modify findings, conclusions and decree in accordance with this opinion:
(1) To award to the irrigation company the ordinary flow of Duck Creek which is controlled, diverted
and used by means of dams as presently constituted,
which amount is hereby fixed at six (or seven, or eight
second feet, as this Court may decide) , together with
the perecentage of the high water flow as awarded by
the trial court and as heretofore referred to in this
opinion.
(2) To limit the use by the plaintiff of the ditches
and laterals of the irrigation company and its stockholders as hereinabove indicated.
(3) To omit any award to Carl Lindstrom.
In other respects the findings, conclusions and
judgment of the trial court are affirmed. Costs to
appellant.
As indicated above, we do not believe such modification to be necessary, but it would be entirely proper and
might avoid further argument. It would also be proper
for this Court to enter its own revised findings without remanding the case, though this would not be usual.
In any event, the plaintiff's motion for rehearing is
without merit and should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON
Attorneys for Duck Creek
Irrigation Company.
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